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From:	 Ulf Harnhammar <ulfh@update.uu.se>
To:	 bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Subject: PHProjekt multiple vulnerabilities
Date:	 Thu, 25 Apr 2002 01:57:55 +0200 (CEST)

PHProjekt multiple vulnerabilities

PROGRAM: PHProjekt
VENDOR: Albrecht Guenther (ag@phprojekt.com) et al.
HOMEPAGE: http://www.phprojekt.com/
VULNERABLE VERSIONS: all versions below 3.2
LOGIN REQUIRED: yes (some issues), no (some issues)
SEVERITY: high


DESCRIPTION:

"PHProjekt is a groupware suite which supports communication and management of
teams and companies via an Intranet and the Internet. It consists of multiple
components, including a group calendar with resource booking, a time card
system, project management, a request tracker, a mutual filesystem, a contact
manager, a mail client, a forum, chat, notes, shared bookmarks, todo lists, a
voting system, and reminders. Language files are available for over 20
languages, and an extensive help system is included."
(direct quote from the program's project page at Freshmeat)

PHProjekt is written in PHP, and it is published under the terms of the GNU
General Public License.


SECURITY HOLES:

I have found many security holes in this program. They can be divided into
five categories:

1) Some of the scripts in the system require that the user is logged in, while
others don't. The system differentiates between them by checking the current
URL in the variable $PHP_SELF to see if it contains strings like "sms" (the
name of one of the scripts that don't require logging in contains that
string). Unfortunately, $PHP_SELF includes the PATH_INFO part of a request.
This means that we can fool the system into thinking that we are accessing a
script that doesn't need logging in, while in fact we are accessing a script
that does. This is done by constructing a URL like
"http://www.somehost.com/phprojekt/mail/mail_send.php/sms", where the
PATH_INFO part is "/sms".

2) The upload functions in the system don't check if the variables related to
an upload actually were set by uploading a file or if they are normal POST
data. This can be used to make the system treat any file it can read, like
"/etc/passwd", as the uploaded data.

3) Many SQL statements in the system include user data without enclosing it in
apostrophes or quotes. This means that much more data than intended can be
deleted or changed. If the system uses the parameter "id" in the string
"UPDATE table SET name='Ulf' WHERE intTableID=$id", giving "id" the value
"intTableID" means that we will end up executing the statement "UPDATE table
SET name='Ulf' WHERE intTableID=intTableID". This statement will change all
names in the table to Ulf.

4) Some of the scripts that should require logging in never check if you are
in fact logged in. This means that a person with insufficient privileges can
view or edit data in the system, by posting the right data to those scripts.

5) Files are accessed without proper checking of their file names for slashes
and dots. This means that we can read files outside of the PHProjekt system by
entering file names like "../../../../../etc/passwd".


COMMUNICATION WITH VENDOR:

The first security hole was reported to the vendor on the 15th of March, and
the last one a couple of weeks later. Version 3.2, which is not vulnerable to
any of these issues, was released on the 11th of April.


RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend that all administrators upgrade to version 3.2 immediately.


// Ulf Harnhammar
ulfh@update.uu.se