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From: TurboLinux Security Team <security@www1.turbolinux.com>
To: tl-security-announce@www1.turbolinux.com
Subject: [TL-Security-Announce] TLSA2001017 Adore Worm Advisory
Date: Mon, 14 May 2001 16:00:18 -0700 (PDT)
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Turbolinux Security Announcement
Adore Worm
Vulnerable Turbolinux platforms: TL Workstation 6.1
Turbolinux Server versions 6.0.5
and earlier
Turbolinux Advisory ID#: TLSA2001017
References: http://www.securityfocus.com/headlines/10964
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Although we have not received any security alerts about Turbolinux systems being infected
by the Adore Worm, the Turbolinux platforms mentioned above can be susceptible to it. Please
take the proper precaution by updating the packages in your installation as soon as possible.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
1. Problem Summary
Adore is a variant of the Ramen worm that creates a backdoor to a Linux system. It
then sends information about the compromised system to four email addresses: two in the
United States and two in China. The worm gets its name from the username associated
with each email address: adore9000 or adore9001.
To create this backdoor, the Adore worm seeks out four flaws associated with the packages
nfs-utils, wu-ftpd, LPRng, and bind.
The four security flaws sought out by the Adore worm are:
a. wu-ftpd: Buffer overrun; due to improper bounds checking, SITE EXEC may
enable remote root execution, without having any local user account
required.
b. nfs-utils: Flaw in the rpc.statd daemon can lead to remote root break in.
Please note that the nfs-utils package will replace the
packages knfsd and knfsd-client. The package knfsd-client
contains the rpc.statd daemon.
c. LPRng: Vulnerability due to incorrect usage of the syslog() function.
Local and remote users can send string-formatting operators to the print-
er daemon to corrupt the daemon's execution, potentially gaining root
access.
d. bind: Buffer overflow in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code.
This vulnerability may allow an attacker to execute code with the same
privileges as the BIND server. Because BIND is typically run by a
superuser account, the execution would occur with superuser privileges.
Once in a system, it replaces an application called PS--used by administrators to list the
currently running programs on a system--with a copy that will list all programs except the
worm. It also sends important system files to the four email addresses. After infecting a
machine and sending information about the computer through e-mail, the worm waits until
4:02 a.m. and then deletes all its files, except the backdoor.
2. Solution
Update the packages from our ftp server by running the following
command:
rpm -Uvh ftp_path_to_filename
Where ftp_path_to_filename is the following:
ftp://ftp.turbolinux.com/pub/updates/6.0/security/nfs-utils-0.2.1-7.i386.rpm
ftp://ftp.turbolinux.com/pub/updates/6.0/security/wu-ftpd-2.6.1-5.i386.rpm
ftp://ftp.turbolinux.com/pub/updates/6.0/security/LPRng-3.6.26-1.i386.rpm
ftp://ftp.turbolinux.com/pub/updates/6.0/security/bind-8.2.3-2.i386.rpm
ftp://ftp.turbolinux.com/pub/updates/6.0/security/bind-contrib-8.2.3-2.i386.rpm
ftp://ftp.turbolinux.com/pub/updates/6.0/security/bind-devel-8.2.3-2.i386.rpm
ftp://ftp.turbolinux.com/pub/updates/6.0/security/bind-utils-8.2.3-2.i386.rpm
The source RPMs can be downloaded here:
ftp://ftp.turbolinux.com/pub/updates/6.0/SRPMS/nfs-utils-0.2.1-7.src.rpm
ftp://ftp.turbolinux.com/pub/updates/6.0/SRPMS/wu-ftpd-2.6.1-5.src.rpm
ftp://ftp.turbolinux.com/pub/updates/6.0/SRPMS/LPRng-3.6.26-1.src.rpm
ftp://ftp.turbolinux.com/pub/updates/6.0/SRPMS/bind-8.2.3-2.src.rpm
**Note: You must rebuild and install the RPM if you choose to download
and install the SRPM. Simply installing the SRPM alone WILL NOT CLOSE
THE SECURITY HOLE.
Please verify the MD5 checksums of the updates before you install:
MD5 sum Package Name
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a11507768f746e6dfbe1b55705ac9b0a wu-ftpd-2.6.1-5.i386.rpm
aec472f299ad23e8e1030f3aeb6733c7 wu-ftpd-2.6.1-5.src.rpm
ddb4b4c0d50650c4a8acc5692b8c0f1a nfs-utils-0.2.1-7.i386.rpm
948e3c6b45db0d18b57713572575d6c8 nfs-utils-0.2.1-7.src.rpm
b4366ecf26b2156d9de3c0bbdce320ca LPRng-3.6.26-1.i386.rpm
a6d6ce0f0291ba42d7fa4ef063bc1107 LPRng-3.6.26-1.src.rpm
dec967e3a1dd16bdcca0c6fe6e9114d6 bind-8.2.3-2.i386.rpm
2e84bbbcd6a09d7c5060dd01480ff3de bind-contrib-8.2.3-2.i386.rpm
06612093126372f8d618ea842fd402ec bind-devel-8.2.3-2.i386.rpm
3f390ce4d1b7ceaa477df62cc3fe3174 bind-utils-8.2.3-2.i386.rpm
25c701c7158af3f773d1a478c8872d05 bind-8.2.3-2.src.rpm
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
These packages are GPG signed by Turbolinux for security. Our key
is available here:
http://www.turbolinux.com/security/tlgpgkey.asc
To verify a package, use the following command:
rpm --checksig name_of_rpm
To examine only the md5sum, use the following command:
md5sum name_of_rpm
**Note: Checking GPG keys requires RPM 3.0 or higher.
________________________________________________________________________________________________
You can find more updates on our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.turbolinux.com/pub/updates/6.0/security/
for TL6.x Workstation and Server security updates
Our webpage for security announcements:
http://www.turbolinux.com/security
If you want to report vulnerabilities, please contact:
security@turbolinux.com
________________________________________________________________________________________________
Subscribe to the Turbolinux Security Mailing lists:
TL-security - A moderated list for discussing security issues
Turbolinux products.
Subscribe at http://www.turbolinux.com/mailman/listinfo/tl-security
TL-security-announce - An announce-only mailing list for security
updates and alerts.
Subscribe at:
http://www.turbolinux.com/mailman/listinfo/tl-security-announce
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